Monthly Report • January 12nd 2023 • Center for Arakan Studies

# Monthly Report | November 2022

Monthly Report | November 2022

### Table of content

- 5-Key Remarks
- Background of the Report
- Key Figures of the Armed Conflict
- Critical Notes on Humanitarian Issues
- Civilian Causalities and other data

### 5-Key Remarks

- The second phase of an informal ceasefire was introduced by the junta forces and the AA on November 26, 2022. Since the resumption of armed clashes on August 2nd, the first week of November marked the highest rate of civilian casualties such as deaths and injuries, compared to the previous three months. This is mostly due to two key causes such as the artillery shellings and intentional gun shots by the junta forces at the village and villagers.
- On the humanitarian front, the suspension of assistance from the INGOs, NGOs and CSOs since September 15 appeared to have more visible negative consequences this month, resulting in the reduction of food consumption and malnutrition for the IDP community. Next, the blockage of communication and transportation routes such as cars and waterways, changed the livelihood system of millions of people in the northern and central parts of the state.
- Besides, the introduction of the current informal ceasefire is quite immediate, given the level of armed clashes and civilian casualties during the second and third week of November. The armed clashes between the two sides stopped on November 20, 2022. But the artillery shelling and, thus, civilian casualties (death) happened until November 22 in Maungdaw township. Yet, the arrests of the civilians still continued up to November 25 when the junta soldiers arrested the administrator of Thanpanchaung Ward, Kyaukphyu, for investigation. It was also the same day that the spokesperson of the junta council spoke about the ceasefire to the media, and the next day, it was also ratified by the ULA/AA.
- AA spokesperson during his press briefing, remarked that the current informal ceasefire is purely a “humanitarian pause” as the group decided to introduce it for the sake of humanitarian cause for the local population. He also added that the military and political standpoints of the ULA/AA would remain the same. Zaw Min Tun, the spokesperson of the junta council, said that the ceasefire was initiated for the better situation of the Rakhine people. Consequently, the liberalization of the blockage of roads and waterways was performed by the junta authority, and the potential for humanitarian tasks also appeared. But the news also reported that the junta military continuously carried out the reinforcements of their bases and stations in various ways. And, the signs for the sustainability of the current informal ceasefire were very low. To conclude, the current truce in Rakhine is neither a military agreement nor a political pact between the two parties. It can mainly be described as the resting time for another round of fighting.

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