Issue Brief • October 2024 • Center for Arakan Studies

# Alternative Justice: Analyzing the ULA’s Legal System in Arakan

Photo/Credit-DMG

### Executive Summary

1. The initiation and expansion of the ULA’s judiciary system can be seen as one of the fastest-growing judiciary channels parallel to the existing state’s judicial system in Myanmar. The two key reasons behind this phenomenon are the increasing power projection by the ULA/AA-led movement and the popularity of the judiciary. Just within two years of its judicial establishment in 2021, the ULA-led judiciary service became the dominant force against the SAC-led courts.

2. Even though the judiciary structure and hierarchy of the ULA are different from those of the SAC, the basic legal system and practices at both courts are not technically very different from each other. Former judges, lawyers, and legal advocates at Naypyidaw’s courts became the judges and lawyers at the ULA courts. On another front, the accessibility, affordability, and effectiveness of the ULA courts are also comparatively greater than those of the SAC

3. The enforcement of the ULA courts is quite recognizable, especially when clients take less time and energy in facing judicial disputes. More importantly, the legal decisions made by the courts have enforcement power carried out by the executive branch, including the police, prisons, and other departments. Furthermore, the ULA courts are seen as politically independent or autonomous in making judicial decisions. However, there are still challenges related to nepotism, favoritism, and corruption depending on individual judges or cases.

4. Public perception of the ULA’s judiciary system is commonly positive, and many see it as obviously better than that of the SAC. However, there are also criticisms, especially regarding the capacity of the judges in the courts and the police investigation to support the judication. Some also suggest the necessity of changing the office environment to suit a ‘modern court’ in terms of infrastructure. More importantly, legal experts point out that the ULA’s judiciary system needs to implement modern tools and techniques to find solutions in highly sensitive cases like rape and murder. Perceptions among minority groups are diverse; while some think it is a better alternative, others point out instances of discrimination.

5. The ULA’s justice system is far from perfect. In some cases, it has faced resounding criticism from the local population due to misbehavior and abuse of power, resulting in the deaths of suspects. With the increasing controls in urban centers, new challenges are emerging, and observers suggest that the ULA’s judiciary system needs adaptable change and reform to provide effective justice for the local population.

### Introduction

#### A: Background Information

The establishment of the judiciary institution by the United League of Arakan/Arakan Army (ULA/AA) in Arakan, known as Rakhine state, is one of the most pioneer tasks carried out by the movement. Even if the ULA has initiated resolution of the judiciary disputes—starting just after a few years of its armed struggles in Arakan region— the introduction of a de facto ceasefire in November 2020 brought a larger momentum of judiciary appearance. This move was strategically taking advantage of the Myanmar military-led State Administration Council (SAC)’s shift in focus towards suppressing nationwide anti-coup movements following the 2021-military coup. The ULA expanded its administrative and judiciary operations in central and northern townships especially in rural areas of Rakhine state.

At that time, their influence spread from central Arakan to areas extending from the Bangladesh border through southern Chin State to southern Rakhine State. The AA first engaged in conflict with the Myanmar military in northern Rakhine State in 2015. Hostilities escalated in late 2018 and persisted until early November 2020, just three months before the military coup. Major-General Twan Mrat Naing, the chairman of the ULA, has advocated for “confederation status” for the people of Arakan, akin to the current governance model of the United Wa State Army (UWSA).

Over the past decade, the ULA/AA has dramatically altered the power dynamics in Rakhine State. Following intense clashes with the Myanmar military between 2015 and 2020, an informal ceasefire in November 2020 allowed the ULA to strengthen its position by building and expanding a parallel administration. Although hostilities resurfaced in late 2021, leading to renewed conflict in 2022, a fragile ceasefire was once again reached in November 2022. The power dynamics in Rakhine have undergone a significant transformation over the past decade, driven by the ULA/AA.

This paper aims to analyze the ULA’s judicial developments and impacts mainly starting from November 2020 to November 2023, a date before the resumption of armed clashes on November 14, 2024. The report also focuses on the parallel structures with the existing SAC judiciary system and how it differs. In addition, the study has also attempted to examine questions like to what extent the judiciary system has the enforcement power and is independent from the political influence. As the ULA’s judiciary evolved over these years, it is critical to examine how it has been perceived by the local population. Therefore, this report also seeks to explore public perceptions of justice under the ULA system and more importantly, uncover the lives of the minority groups under the ULA jurisdiction. Finally, the report analyzed the critiques and suggestions towards the ULA judiciary including the three prominent judicial cases that had encountered concerns of the local community.

For the data analysis, this report relies on a range of qualitative data to explore the development and impact of the ULA’s judiciary system. Key data sources include Key Informant Interview (KII), interviews with local residents, and those who have possessed experiences in this sector as well as observations from the local CAS team members. Besides, the report also analyzed some local and international media reports, official ULA statements, and other relevant documents to contextualize the judiciary's role and function. By drawing from these diverse qualitative sources, the study offered a comprehensive understanding of the ULA's judiciary and its broader implications for justice in Arakan.

#### B: Literature Review

In conflict zones, political legitimacy is often built through the provision of justice by rebel (armed groups) or alternative governance systems. These non-state justice mechanisms emerge where state authority is weak or contested, offering communities a sense of order and accountability. The perception of fairness, efficiency, and accessibility of these insurgent-led judicial systems plays a critical role in shaping public support. For instance, Stathis Kalyvas (2006) highlighted how armed organizations, or armed groups use governance structures, including courts, as a strategic tool to foster legitimacy among civilians

Similarly, Clunan and Trinkunas (2010) emphasized that these systems often fill the void left by ineffective state institutions, gaining traction by resolving local disputes and upholding social norms6. South Sudan, still grappling with the fallout from a 50-year civil war and ongoing ethnic conflicts, faces significant challenges in its nation-building efforts. The recent ethnic clashes highlight the need for a rule-of-law strategy that adheres to modern human rights standards while integrating the legal traditions of its over 60 ethnic groups7. The coexistence of traditional justice systems with a weak statutory legal framework underscores the importance of these systems in such a diverse country. Center for Arakan Studies. In South Sudan, traditional justice systems were seen as more legitimate than state courts, while Hezbollah’s parallel courts in Lebanon helped solidify its political base

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© Center for Arakan Studies [CAS].

The CAS is an independent, non-partisan and research-oriented group conducting research and analyzing issues related to Arakan/Rakhine affairs.

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