Summary

Just 20 months after a de facto ceasefire between the Myanmar military and the Arakan Army (AA), a series of armed clashes resumed in three locations in northern Rakhine, and another one in its neighboring southern Chin state’s Paletwa.

The returning war since August 2022 shows no signs of stopping now. The negative impacts of the armed conflict on the civilian population are also quite visible.

The objectives of the current report are to present the changing conflict map in Rakhine and its neighboring areas, and to analyze the relations among changes in terms of armed clashes plus casualties, arrests, and humanitarian crisis. The collected data in this report mainly rely on the local, national, and regional news and observations.

The current report will also consist of three key sections such as new developments regarding the changing conflict map and its consequences, notes on the civilian causalities and the topic of humanitarian challenges. In the final part, four key highlights during the previous three months have been mentioned.

Background

Rakhine State is one of the most underdeveloped and highly conflicted areas in Myanmar despite having its rich and proud memories in its history. It is also a place that is militarily unstable, politically fragile, economically impoverished, socially fragmented, culturally, and ethnically diverse, religiously divided. As a result of the military coup in the first week of February last year, the country has fallen into a situation of political turmoil, administrative vacuum and rising violence and a nationwide political uprising against the military junta.

Nevertheless, Rakhine State remained relatively stable while other states and regions witnessed massive peaceful protests against the coup, civil services joined the civil disobedience movement (CDM) and a few months later, peaceful protesters turned into armed resistance groups.

The junta’s council ended an-internet shutdown that had been in effect for 18 months 1* and offered Arakan National Party (ANP)’s leader a seat on its administrative council on February 2 2*. The council also released Rakhine nationalist politician Dr. Aye Maung and Rakhine Writer Wai Han Aung on February 13, 2021 3*, as well as AA leader family members on June 9 last year 4*. Later in March 2021, the United League of Arakan (ULA) and its armed wing, the AA were also delisted from “the terrorist list”. But the junta remains the group on the list of ‘unlawful association’.

Yet, the political and military climate of Rakhine had been relatively stable most of the time because of the policies of the junta State administration Council (SAC) to separate the Rakhine region from other political movements in the country, and the United League of Arakan (ULA) leadership to focus more on the military, political and administrative build-ups by maintaining stability in Rakhine and sponsoring anti-coup regime political movements.

However, the resumption of the current armed clashes has become inevitable due after the informal military agreement never reached a political agreement while the junta authority efforted to contain the military and administrative expansions of the ULA into the central and southern parts of the state. Consequently, the ULA leadership was unhappy with the imposition of trade and trade restriction by the junta in the state.

From 2018-2020, analysts described fighting between the AA and the Sit-Tat as the fiercest Myanmar had seen in decades and the AA’s fighting has become one of the most serious the threats against the junta’s forces 5*.

Just before the national election, around two years of fighting suddenly ceased in Rakhine brokered by Sasakwa, Japanese peace envoy. Soon after the military seized power in February last year, the AA avoided breaking a truce instead, the group's political wing, ULA took the opportunity reportedly to extend its administrative and judicial mechanisms across Rakhine 6*.

The group officially announced in early August that the residents in Rakhine could file or submit their legal disputes including over crimes, land issues, and theft to the ULA’s judiciary department. It also said it intends “to bring justice for all people living in Rakhine State, regardless of race and religion” 7*.

As the ULA administration grows, the de facto ceasefire between two groups was not able to formalise due after the junta started to contain the ULA administrative expansion and reinforced its troop across Rakhine, and the AA refused an invitation to join junta-peace talks in the Naypyidaw in early June.

Soon after, the deputy leader of the junta administration during his visit to Rakhine ordered his troops to be “ready to fight any time.” 8*.

On July 4, the tension between both exploded after the junta launched an airstrike against an AA base in a territory controlled by the Karen National Union, killing at least six soldiers and injuring many others. A week later, the AA launched a retaliatory attack against junta forces in northern Rakhine, killing at least four, injuring many others and capturing at least 14 alive.

In early August, a series of armed clashes between the AA and junta forces erupted in three locations in northern Rakhine, and another one in its neighboring southern Chin state.