This report aims at the regional and international community including both governmental and nongovernmental organizations including journalists, scholars, academia, and interested individuals to gain a better understanding of Rakhine/Arakan affairs.
1. The ULA/AA gained more territory
In the previous round of conflict (2018-2020), Maungdaw township stood as low intensity conflict area with no big challenge to the junta control along the border areas with Bangladesh.
The resumed armed clashes in August changed this conflict map ending the de facto control of AA over a large swath of new territory in the northern Maungdaw bordering Bangladesh. In line with CSA data, Paletwa and Maungdaw stand at the most frequent and fierce battlefield areas in the previous three months and the AA has also captured at least 31junta military outposts, and camps especially in the bordering areas with Bangladesh and on the Mayu mountain range.
This turning point also caused the junta reinforcement means from using land routes by military vehicles to using waterways from the ports in Rakhine state capital Sittwe to the ports in Maungdaw township.
2. Targeted arrests of its servants, businesspeople, and social workers
Differently from the previous round of conflict, both the military junta and AA engaged in a more limited form of warfare for designated territory and purposes. While the AA accelerated its attacks in the northernmost townships of the state such as Maungdaw, Buthedaung, and neighboring Paletwa, the military junta tried not to lose more territory in these areas and made no major offensives operations in other townships.
However, for this time, the countering tactics of the junta are arresting suspicious junta servants and businessmen on account of giving taxes and donating money into the ULA treasury and social workers accused of aiding the AA members and IDP community.
At least 29 government servants, 26 businesspersons, and 14 social workers were arrested and detained among the arrested population. This tactic is also criticized as aiming to cut off the sources of support for the ULA/AA movement.
3. Forced attempts to relocate IDP
Amidst rising civilian deaths and injuries across the battlefields and blockage on the flow of humanitarian assistance to the IDP camps, the junta authority attempted to do the forced return of the IDP community in several locations of the northern townships.
On October 19, the local junta officers summoned and forced the camp leaders to move involuntarily and used various tactics to do it such as cutting off the aids, possible charges of trespassing, and other forms of threat and pressure in Buthidaug township.
The IDPs responded that they are not ready for this plan as the conflicts in their original area are ongoing, the danger of landmines is still active, and they can be human shields on the battlefields. Although the possible actions by the junta for refusing to move from the current location is still unknown, many IDPs are worried that they can be arrested, and their homes could be demolished.
Apart from this humanitarian issue, the arrest on Rohingya for moving outside of Rakhine state also increased in the previous three months. The latest data from Burman Human Rights Network (BHRN) showed that at least 209 in August, 145 in September and 295 in October were arrested by the junta authority in various locations and are most convicted under section 6 (3) of the 1949 Residents of Burman Registration Act, which carries a maximum two-year sentence. 12*